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Book Reviews: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS September 1996 
ing the potential global implications of the democratic 
peace. 
Although succeeding chapters address a somewhat eclec- 
tic collection of topics, Ray skillfully manages to weave 
them together into a single fabric. For example, early on he 
concedes that the democratic peace may indeed be vulner- 
able to the charge that wars between democracies are rarely 
observed in history simply because both democracies and 
wars are themselves so exceedingly rare. Yet, this conces- 
sion is a strategic one, for once made it immediately 
elevates the significance of any possible exceptions to the 
strict claim that democracies have never waged war against 
one another. Ray then considers a long list of reported 
exceptions, all of which fail to qualify as wars or democra- 
cies (or both) under his carefully stipulated definitions. 
Definitions are the crux of the matter, of course, and while 
Ray admittedly crafts his definitions to produce the desired 
outcome, the definitions he devises are in the end neither 
strained nor unreasonable. 
The case studies in chapter 5 are also tied to the 
statistical rarity of wars and democracies, albeit in a some- 
what different manner. It is precisely because democratic 
wars are not very likely under any circumstances that 
aggregate statistical evidence must be supplemented "with 
insights and persuasive power that can be generated only by 
intensive analyses of individual cases" (p. 207). The cases 
under analysis have been cleverly chosen to form a most 
similar systems comparison of two international disputes 
from 1898, one involving two democracies (France and 
Britain) that narrowly avoided war (Fashoda) and the other 
involving a democracy (United States) and a marginally 
nondemocratic opponent (Spain) that did result in war. Ray 
structures his comparison as a "pseudo-experiment" in 
order to fix attention on the numerous factors other than 
democracy that might plausibly account for the differing 
outcomes. There is much to admire in Ray's deft handling 
of his two cases. Here, as elsewhere, he carefully considers 
all sides of the available historical evidence and prudently 
qualifies his assertions where necessary. This chapter also 
stands as a methodological exemplar of how case studies 
and statistical findings can mutually reinforce each other. 
Not every chapter is quite so tightly integrated to the 
theme, however. The most transparent example is chapter 
4, which is devoted entirely to the methodological justifica- 
tion of case studies. Few will quarrel with Ray's treatment 
of this issue-it is a superbly integrated statement of the 
widely held view that judiciously constructed case studies 
and statistical analyses are complementary. In fact, this 
chapter stands virtually on its own and could well serve as a 
valuable methodological resource for students and others 
employing case studies in their own research. Still, one 
wonders whether so extensive a treatment was really nec- 
essary in this particular context. 
Questions of relevance may also arise with regard to 
Ray's analysis of regime transitions (chap. 2). Here Ray 
employs an innovative procedure to disentangle state-level 
from systemic-level effects on global regime changes. The 
main point about regime change is plain enough: If democ- 
racy implies peaceful relations with other democracies and 
if more states are turning toward democracy, then the world 
should become a more peaceful place. This is indeed a 
profound statement, with implications of immense propor- 
tions, which is obviously relevant to the democratic peace 
and surely is one reason why the issue has so captured the 
attention of scholars and policymakers alike. What is not 
quite so plain, at least in the context of the democratic 
peace, is why it matters whether regime transitions are 
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governed by system-level or state-level forces. Ray seems to 
be suggesting that the global ramifications of the demo- 
cratic peace are on a more precarious footing if state-level 
factors dominate. Yet, why this must be so is never made 
entirely clear. 
This is a book with something of genuine value for 
anyone seriously interested in democracy or international 
conflict and should be essential reading for those conver- 
sant in the contemporary debate over the democratic peace. 
The questions Ray addresses are among the most important 
of our time, and, while he does not provide all the answers, 
he does offer us many fresh insights and new ways of 
thinking intelligently about them. Those who have already 
made up their minds on the democratic peace may well find 
certain of his arguments discomforting, but in the end this 
is a small price to pay for the book's rich rewards. 
Jacques Delors and European Integration. By George Ross. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 326p. $35.00. 
Leon Hurwitz, Cleveland State University 
Five hundred years after the Europeans discovered and 
began to form a New World in the Americas, they have set 
out to rediscover and reorganize their Old World at home. 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome, building upon the 1951 Treaty of 
Paris (the European Coal and Steel Community), estab- 
lished the European Economic Community (the predeces- 
sor of the European Community/European Union). As 
refined by subsequent treaties (most notably the Single 
European Act of 1987 and the Treaty on European Union 
[the "Maastricht Treaty"]) and combined with the current 
intergovernmental conference, this initiative shows that 
Western Europe represents the best example of regional 
interdependence, the enhancement of the management of 
international cooperation, and the harmonization of certain 
public policies. Although there have been many manage- 
ment failures in the past, it is the European Community/ 
European Union that has enjoyed the most success in 
regional economic-and political-integration and the 
management of international cooperation. 
George Ross's study of Jacques Delors and European 
integration could not have appeared at a more timely 
moment. The intergovernmental conference, with its year- 
long deliberations over the operationalization of the Maas- 
tricht Treaty, opened in Turin in late March 1996. The final 
decisions reached at this conference will no doubt be a 
surrogate measure of Jacques Delors's legacy. 
The book is a rather detailed account of the author's 
six-month sojourn as a "participant observer" in the cabinet 
of European Commission President Jacques Delors at (the 
now nonfunctional) Berlaymont in Brussels and places 
elsewhere during the first half of 1991. Unfortunately, and 
the following comments are the only negative ones offered, 
Professor Ross appears to have fallen prey to the flaw 
endemic to this methodology: the participant-observer ar- 
rives home with so much material that it is usually very 
difficult or even impossible to discard even one notecard or 
cassette. The trivial for the outsider becomes the significant 
for the researcher; the amusing but unnecessary anecdote 
becomes empirical analysis; the mundane becomes a matter 
of state and high politics. It is as if the researcher believes 
that if seen (or heard or recorded or thought), the infor- 
mation must therefore be published. 
This book does not escape this criticism; a few examples 
will suffice: people "bark" orders; the seating arrangements 
around a table are described along with the wine service; 
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states of mind and motives are imputed; lunches are 
characterized as "gloomy" (the food? the people? the 
conversation? the bill?); even the weather does not go 
unnoticed (it was a "cold and foggy" day). Perhaps the best 
(worst) example of this occurs when Professor Ross de- 
scribes some intellectual (or lack thereof), physical, and 
personal characteristics of some former commission mem- 
bers: "Manuel Marin, the Commission matinee idol (he was 
a young and handsome man), was unpredictable and 
moody" (p. 160). Would that participants refrain from 
publishing such observations! 
These comments aside, the book is a fascinating treasure 
for those among us who care about international integra- 
tion, the European Union, decision-making processes, and 
the individuals who are involved. Although Professor Ross 
is quite respectful of Jacques Delors, the book is not 
hagiography-some of the warts and pimples are revealed. 
The author writes that Jacques Delors "is the most success- 
ful Commission leader in the history of the Community" 
(pp. 14-15). I agree, but I would go one step beyond 
George Ross: Jacques Delors's success transcends the 
commission, and he will join the select group of those who 
rediscovered Europe (e.g., Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, 
Konrad Adenauer, Walter Hallstein, Paul-Henri Spaak, 
Maurice Faure, Gaetano Martino, Joseph Bech, and J. W. 
Beyen). 
Jacques Delors arrived at the European Commission at a 
time of "Euro-pessimism" and "Euro-sclerosis" but through 
several bold initiatives (e.g., the Single European Act, 
Maastricht, the Common Security and Foreign Policy, 
enlargement, European Monetary Union) he reinvigorated 
the process through economic liberalism while maintaining 
and strengthening Europe's social uniqueness. The union 
that Jacques Delors left to his successors is different-vastly 
different-from the one he found in the mid-1980s: a union 
of 15 with as many as 25 additional countries camped on 
Brussels's doorstep. 
There still remains a host of unresolved issues-issues 
that the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference has on its 
agenda: widening versus deepening; relations with the rest 
of Europe; the Common Security and Foreign Policy; a new 
institutional framework; voting procedures; common or 
harmonized policies regarding police cooperation, immi- 
gration, taxes, and welfare; European Monetary Union with 
its "Euro-Fed" and a single currency; the democratic deficit. 
But perhaps even more crucial to the future of Europe 
than these issues and having a link to how the future will 
assess the contributions of Jacques Delors is the very nature 
that the integration process will assume. There are at least 
three models: 
(1) Europe "a la carte"-each member state can pick 
and choose the specific public policies to which it will 
adhere and from which it will opt out (or, as the 
British claim with monetary union, the ones it will 
opt into). This model by its very nature denies the 
longstanding tradition of accepting the acquis com- 
munautaire. 
(2) Europe "at different speeds"-certain core countries 
will be the vanguard of achieving new levels of 
integration (e.g., the monetary union and a single 
currency) with the laggards slowly, but eventually, 
catching up. 
(3) Europe "on a bicycle"-all 15 (or 20 or 30 or 40) 
must pedal together at the same speed in a forward 
direction or the entire infrastructure will crash. 
George Ross writes (p. 16) that Jacques Delors was an 
aficionado of cycling in his youth. 
Towards a New Europe: Stops and Starts in Regional 
Integration. Edited by Gerald Schneider, Patricia Weits- 
man, and Thomas Bernauer. Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1995. 240p. $55.00. 
Robert Leonardi, London School of Economics 
This book tries to break new ground in the study of the 
European Union (EU). In the past, studies of the EU have 
either been extremely descriptive in nature (based on the 
assumption that the reader knew nothing about European 
integration) or bogged down in the debate between inter- 
governmentalists and comparativists over how the EU 
should be studied. The contributions contained in Towards 
a New Europe break through this intellectual logjam by 
advocating and showing how the study of the politics and 
policies of the EU can be grounded in more rigorous, 
mathematical formulations of spatial models. As the editors 
state in the concluding chapter, the study of the EU needs 
to be placed on more rigorous research ground if we are 
ever to move toward a future when research will become 
cumulative and the assumptions behind the research will be 
rendered explicit. 
The authors have done a superb job in illustrating the 
types of models that can be used to study the decision- 
making process associated with the issues of expansion of 
members as the European Union contemplates its future 
after the year 2000 (the Cederman, Pahre, and Mattli 
chapters), the role in the overall decision-making process in 
which the European Parliament plays an increasingly im- 
portant part (Tsebelis), and the logic associated with the 
future selection of Europe's central bankers (Martin). 
These chapters are combined with two chapters dealing 
with issues tangential, but complementary, to the study of 
the EU: the nature of Swiss federalism ("Switzerland-Still 
a Paradigmatic Case?" by Hug and Sciarini) and the future 
of NATO ("Full Membership or Full Club? Expansion of 
NATO and the Future Security Organization of Europe" by 
Bernauer). 
Despite the innovative approach, the book is less success- 
ful in producing genuinely new research results. It is not 
clear how the models proposed can be used, above and 
beyond the few cases and the limited period cited in the 
chapters. What can the proposed models tell us about other 
periods when decisions at the European level were taken 
under a different set of rules and when the alternatives 
available to national governments in the realm of sectoral 
policies were based on a significantly different set of as- 
sumptions? A model is of value when it allows us to 
understand a wide variety of cases, rather than only the few 
cases discussed in these chapters. 
In reading the book I was reminded of the vast literature 
on modeling in the field of econometrics and evaluation 
studies. The theoretical work is illuminating in its formal, 
mathematical structure, but it is much less satisfactory when 
one tries to use the models to understand the empirical 
reality. Either the models are so complex that they take into 
account everything (thereby making it difficult to elaborate 
parsimonious conclusions) or the operationalization of the 
models is so narrow that very little is added to our knowl- 
edge of empirical reality. 
The lack of a thorough empirical testing of the models 
proposed here is one of the shortcomings of the book. 
Scholars of the EU will pick up this book with the expec- 
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